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Majority Rule for Belief Evolution in Social Networks
Abstract
In this paper, we study how an agent’s belief is
affected by her neighbors in a social network.
We first introduce a general framework, where
every agent has an initial belief on a statement,
and updates her belief according to her and
her neighbors’ current beliefs under some be-
lief evolution functions, which, arguably, should
satisfy some basic properties. Then, we fo-
cus on the majority rule belief evolution func-
tion, that is, an agent will (dis)believe the
statement iff more than half of her neighbors
(dis)believe it. We consider some fundamen-
tal issues about majority rule belief evolution,
for instance, whether the belief evolution pro-
cess will eventually converge. The answer is no
in general. However, for random asynchronous
belief evolution, this is indeed the case.
1 Introduction
How agents change their beliefs is a fundamental prob-
lem in Artificial Intelligence. Traditionally in the area
of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, this prob-
lem is normally formalized in some logical formalism,
e.g., propositional logic, and minimal change serves as
the first principle [Alchourro´n et al., 1985; Katsuno and
Mendelzon, 1989].
In this paper, we consider this problem from a social
aspect, that is, how an agent’s belief is affected by her
neighbors in a social network. For instance, an agent
might form a belief that the share price of IBM will in-
crease tomorrow when she discussed this issue with her
colleagues. However, she might also change this belief,
i.e., to believe that the price will actually decrease, after
convinced by her family members later on.
In fact, this aspect, also known as opinion formation
and social learning, has been widely studied in other
relevant fields such as mathematics and statistics [De-
Groot, 1974; Holley and Liggett, 1975; Liggett, 1985;
Krause, 2000], economics [Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993;
DeMarzo et al., 2003; Sandholm, 2010; Acemoglu et al.,
2010; Golub and Jackson, 2010], sociology [Friedkin and
Johnsen, 2010; Hegselmann and Krause, 2002], biology
[Clifford and Sudbury, 1973] and so on. Recently, it has
also attracted some attentions in theoretical computer
science [Bindel et al., 2011]. However, as far as we know,
it has been long neglected in the AI community.
Consider a multiagent context, where a social commu-
nity is formed by some agents. This is usually modeled
by a graph as a social network, where each node repre-
sents an agent and each edge represents a social tie be-
tween two agents. Now consider the agents’ beliefs about
a particular statement, e.g., whether the share price of
IBM will increase tomorrow. An agent may form a belief
about this statement based on some observations and ev-
idences, e.g., the financial situation of IBM recently and
the trading volume of the stock today. However, her be-
lief is also heavily affected by other agents, in particular,
her friends’ opinions on this statement.
In this paper, we first introduce a general framework
to model this phenomenon. We consider the agents’ be-
liefs about a particular statement in a social network.
Initially, each agent has a prior belief, which might be
formed based on her own experiences, observations and
evidences. Then, the agents start to communicate each
other synchronously or asynchronously, and update their
beliefs according to their neighbors’ current beliefs in the
social network under some belief evolution function. We
argue that these belief evolution function, although can
be defined in many different ways, should satisfy a list
of basic properties.
Next, we focus on the majority rule as the belief evo-
lution function. That is, an agent will (dis)believe the
statement iff more than half of her neighbors (dis)believe
it. Majority rule is one of the most natural and well
studied function in related fields such as voting [Gaert-
ner, 2009]. It does make sense under our context as well.
For instance, in the IBM share price scenario, if a ma-
jority number of traders believe that the stock price will
increase/decrease, this will likely be the case.
We investigate some fundamental properties about
this function. Among them, a key issue is the conver-
gence of the belief evolution process, i.e., will all evolu-
tion sequences be stable eventually. It can be observed
that this is not the case in general. However, we show
that, for random asynchronous belief evolution, this is
indeed the case.
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2 Belief Evolution in Social Networks
We consider a multiagent context. A society is formed
by some agents that are connected. Formally, a social
network N is a directed graph 〈A, T 〉, where A is a set of
actors (also called individuals or agents) in a society, and
T ⊆ A×A is a set of dyadic ties (also called relationships
or connections) among agents. We assume that (a, a) ∈
T for all a ∈ A as an agent must know herself. We say
that b is connected to a if (b, a) ∈ T , and connected by
a if (a, b) ∈ T . For convenience, we simply use a ∈ N to
denote a ∈ A.
Now we consider the agents’ beliefs about a statement
s, for instance, whether the share price of IBM will in-
crease tomorrow. The agents’ beliefs might be formed
according to many different reasons. We group them
into two categories: evidence based influences and com-
munication based influences. The former includes some
facts such as the financial situation of IBM in the last
three months while the latter includes some facts such
as the opinions of the agents’ friends on this statement.
In this paper, we separate the influences of these two
categories into two steps. First, all the agents form an
initial belief on the statement based on the evidence
based influences. Then, the agents start to communi-
cate each other to update their beliefs. We are mainly
focused on the latter step, called belief evolution.
Once formed an initial belief, at a certain time point,
all the agents’ beliefs on the statement can be viewed as
a belief profile.
Definition 1 (Belief profile) Let N = 〈A, T 〉 be a
network, and s a statement. A belief profile P of N
on s is a mapping from A to {0, 1}, i.e., P : A 7→ {0, 1}.
Here, P (a), a ∈ A is the opinion of agent a on the state-
ment s. Particularly, P (a) = 1 means that the agent a
believes s, while P (a) = 0 means that a disbelieves s,
i.e., a believes ¬s.
Given a statement s and a network N , we say that a
belief profile P of N on s is a consensus iff all agents have
the same belief, i.e., either for all a ∈ N , P (a) = 1 or for
all a, P (a) = 0. We say that two profiles are isomorphic
if there is a one-to-one correspondence between them.
We say that a profile P is less or equal than another
profile P ′, denoted by P ≤ P ′, if for all a ∈ N , P (a) ≤
P ′(a). We use P to denote a new profile obtained from
P by flipping over all beliefs, i.e., for all a ∈ N , P (a) =
1− P (a).
In this paper, we only consider a single statement
s. This is because the influences of other statements
on s are categorized as evidence based, and their influ-
ences are taken into account in the agents’ initial beliefs.
Hence, we omit s in the belief profile P if it is clear from
the context. Also, we assume that the network structure
is fixed throughout the paper. Hence, we sometimes omit
N in the belief profile P as well.
We can visualize a belief profile P as a labeled graph
based on the network N with a label on each node, either
1 or 0, indicating this agent’s opinion on the statement.
1 1
11
0 1
01
1 0
10
1 1
00
P1 P2 P3 P4
N0
Figure 1: Belief profiles of the network N0
Example 1 Figure 1 depicts four belief profiles of the
same network N0. Here, P1 is a consensus while the
rest are not; P2 and P3 are isomorphic; also P2 = P3;
P4 ≤ P1 but it is not comparable with P2.
The belief profile defines all agents’ opinions on the
statement at a certain time point. At this time point,
the agents will communicate with other agents and re-
consider their beliefs. The reconsideration is based on
their own strategies.
Definition 2 (Belief evolution function) Let N =
〈A, T 〉 be a social network, a ∈ A an agent and s a state-
ment. A belief evolution function f of a on s, denoted
by fa, is a mapping fa : P 7→ {0, 1}, where P is the set
of all possible belief profiles of N on s.
Intuitively, after taking into account the overall belief
profile P on s in the network N , the agent a decides to
revise her belief to a new one fa(P ). For convenience,
we use fN to denote the collection of all belief evolu-
tion functions of agents in N and use fN (P ) to denote
the belief profile obtained from P by applying fN on all
agents. In this sense, fN updates a belief profile to a
new one. Again, s might be omitted in fa and fN .
The belief evolution function in Definition 2 can be de-
fined arbitrarily. For example, a special one is so-called
stubborn, that is, the agent never changes her belief. On
the contrary, another function is that the agent always
flips over her belief at every step. There are other pos-
sibilities, for instance, an agent will change her belief
as soon as there are at least 3 of her friends taking an
opposite opinion.
However, not every belief evolution function is ratio-
nal, for instance, the one that always flipping over her
beliefs. Of course, we are only interested in those ratio-
nal ones. For this purpose, we propose a list of desirable
properties. Let N = 〈A, T 〉 be a network and a ∈ A. We
say that a belief evolution function fa is
bounded if min{P (b) | b ∈ N} ≤ fa(P ) ≤
max{P (b) | b ∈ N} for all profiles P .
neutral if fa(P ) = 1− fa(P ) for all profiles P .
congruent if fa(P ) = fa′(P
′) for any two isomorphic
profiles P and P ′, where a and a′ are corresponded.
local if for any two profiles P and P ′ that agree s for
all agents connected by a (including a herself), i.e.,
for all b ∈ N such that (a, b) ∈ T , P (b) = P ′(b), we
have fa(P ) = fa(P
′).
monotonic if P ≤ P ′ implies that fa(P ) ≤ fa(P ′) for
all profiles P and P ′.
non-slavish if there does not exist an agent b such that
for all profiles P , fa(P ) = P (b).
We say that the collection fN of all believe evolution
functions is bounded (neutral, congruent, local, mono-
tonic and non-slavish) if for all a ∈ N , fa is bounded
(neutral, congruent, local, monotonic and non-slavish).
We argue that a rational belief evolution function
should satisfy these properties. Boundedness means that
the agent will not change her belief if all agents reach a
consensus. Neutrality means that the function will not
be affected by how the statement is represented, for in-
stance, from s to ¬s. Congruency means that the func-
tion will not be affected by how the social network is
represented. Locality means that the agent only has
local information, that is, the agent is not able to get
the beliefs of those agents not known by her. Mono-
tonicity means that if an agent changes her belief to a
new positive (negative resp.) one under a circumstance,
then in another circumstance that is at least as positive
(negative) as this one, she will do the same thing. Fi-
nally, non-slavishness means that the agent cannot be
dominated by a single agent in any circumstance. In
particular, non-slavishness implies non-stubbornness.
Not every belief function satisfies these properties. For
instance, the stubborn function satisfies all but not non-
slavishness. The one that always flips over beliefs is neu-
tral, congruent, local, non-slavish but does not satisfy
the rest. The one that changes the belief iff 3 of her
friends having an opposite opinion is bounded, congru-
ent, local, neutral, non-slavish (if connected to at least
3 other agents) but not monotonic.
By applying the belief evolution functions, the belief
profile of a network changes from one to another. We
call this a belief evolution step. First, we consider the
case that all agents have to reconsider their beliefs at
every step, called synchronous belief evolution. Given an
initial belief profile P 0 and the belief evolution function
fN for all agents in the network N , the synchronous
belief evolution will perform iteratively.
Definition 3 (Synchronous belief evolution) Let
N = 〈A, T 〉 be a network, and fN a collection of belief
evolution functions for all agents in N . Let P 0 be
an initial belief profile of N on a statement s. The
synchronous belief evolution for P 0 under fN is a
sequence {P 0, . . . , P i, . . .} of belief profiles, where P i+1
is obtained from P i by applying fN as follows:
for any a ∈ N,P i+1(a) = fa(P i).
We simply write P i+1 = fN (P
i).
Also, we consider asynchronous belief evolution, in
which not all agents are forced to reconsider their beliefs
at a certain time point. The rationale for asynchronous
belief evolution is twofold. First, different agents may
communicate with their friends asynchronously due to,
e.g., the frequency of contact and/or the strength of their
friendship. Second, it is possible that an agent may
sometimes stick on her own belief even she knows her
friends’ opinions.
Let B be a subset of agents in a network N and P a
belief profile of N . The belief profile obtained from P
by applying fN on agents in B, denoted by f
B
N (P ), is
• fBN (P )(a) = fa(P ), for a ∈ B.
• fBN (P )(a) = P (a), for a 6∈ B.
Definition 4 (Asynchronous belief evolution)
Let N = 〈A, T 〉 be a network, and fN a collection of
belief evolution functions for all agents in N . Let P 0
be an initial belief profile of N on a statement s, and
σ = B1, . . . Bn, . . . be a sequence of groups of agents.
The asynchronous belief evolution for P 0 under fN
with respect to σ is a sequence {P 0, . . . , P i, . . .} of belief
profiles, where P i+1 = f
Bi+1
N (P
i).
Here, Bi means those agents who want to reconsider
their beliefs at time point i. In asynchronous belief evo-
lution, P i+1 is obtained from P i, fN together with Bi+1.
Clearly, synchronous belief evolution can be regarded as
a special case of asynchronous belief evolution by setting
the sequence of groups of agents as A, . . . A, . . ..
We are mainly interested in the dynamics of the
agents’ beliefs. In the framework, the agents will up-
date their beliefs according to other agents’ opinions. A
question is, will this evolution process stop, if yes, at
what kind of belief profiles?
Definition 5 (Equilibrium) Let N be a network and
fN the belief evolution functions. We say that a belief
profile P is an equilibrium under fN if P = fN (P ).
Proposition 1 That P is an equilibrium under fN iff
for any subset B of agents, P = fBN (P ).
Proof: That P is an equilibrium under fN iff for all
agents a, P (a) = fa(P ) iff for any subset B of agents,
P = fBN (P ). 
Proposition 1, although simple, shows that equilib-
rium in terms of synchronous belief evolution is the same
as equilibrium in terms of asynchronous belief evolution.
Obviously, if fN is bounded, then the consensus profile
must be an equilibrium under any evolution function fN .
However, if fN is not bounded, maybe there exists no
equilibrium under fN at all. A simple counterexample
is that an agent always flips over her belief.
In this paper, our main concern is whether a belief
evolution process will eventually terminate on an equi-
librium.
Definition 6 (Convergence) Let N be a network, fN
the belief evolution functions, P 0 an initial belief profile
of N and σ a sequence of groups of agents. The belief
evolution for P 0 under fN with respect to σ converges if
there exists a number k such that P k is an equilibrium
of fN . In this case, P
k is called the convergence of this
belief evolution process. For synchronous evolution, we
simply say that the evolution process for P 0 under fN
converges.
It can be observed that for some fN , the evolution
process will never converge, e.g., the one that an agent
always flips over her beliefs. Of course, this is an extreme
case as the belief evolution function is not rational.
3 Majority Rule for Belief Evolution
This section dedicates to a natural yet representative be-
lief evolution function of the framework presented in the
previous section, namely the majority rule function, orig-
inated from the majority rule for voting system [Gaert-
ner, 2009]. For majority rule evolution function, an
agent will change her belief iff a majority number of her
friends (including herself) have an opposite opinion.
Definition 7 (Majority rule) Let N = 〈A, T 〉 be a
social network and a ∈ A an agent. The majority rule
belief evolution function ma is defined as
ma(P ) =
 1 if N
+(a, P ) > N−(a, P )
0 if N+(a, P ) < N−(a, P )
P (a) if N+(a, P ) = N−(a, P ),
where P is a belief profile of N , N+(a, P ) = |{b|(a, b) ∈
T, P (b) = 1}| and N−(a, P ) = |{b|(a, b) ∈ T, P (b) = 0}|
respectively. We use mN to denote the collection of all
majority rule functions of agents in N .
Here, N+(a, P ) (N−(a, P )) is the number of agents con-
nected by a and (dis)believing in the statement.
The majority rule function satisfies all desirable prop-
erties mentioned in the previous section.
Theorem 2 The majority rule belief evolution function
is bounded, neutral, congruent, local, monotonic, and is
non-slavish if every agent is connected to at least two
other agents.
Proof: For space reasons, we only show that the major-
ity rule function is monotonic here. Suppose that P and
P ′ are two profiles such that P ≤ P ′. Then, for agent
a and every agent b (including a) connected by a, i.e.,
(a, b) ∈ T , we have P (b) ≤ P ′(b). There are three cases:
• ma(P ) = 0. In this case, ma(P ) ≤ ma(P ′).
• ma(P ) = 1 and N−(a, P ) = N+(a, P ). In this case,
P (a) = 1 and N−(a, P ′) ≤ N−(a, P ) = N+(a, P ) ≤
N+(a, P ′). Therefore, P ′(a) = 1 and N−(a, P ′) ≤
N+(a, P ′). Hence, ma(P ′) = 1 so that ma(P ) ≤
ma(P
′).
• ma(P ) = 1 and N−(a, P ) < N+(a, P ). In this case,
N−(a, P ′) ≤ N−(a, P ) < N+(a, P ) ≤ N+(a, P ′).
Hence, ma(P
′) = 1 so that ma(P ) ≤ ma(P ′).

We apply the majority rule function for belief evolu-
tion. We are mainly interested in some fundamental is-
sues related to equilibrium, convergence and consensus.
For instance, given a network, what are the equilibria
under the majority rule function? Does every evolution
sequence converge for any initial belief profile? Can the
consensus be reached eventually?
First of all, let us consider some examples for syn-
chronous belief evolution.
Example 2 Figure 2 depicts the synchronous belief evo-
lution processes under the majority rule function for two
different instances, where the agents and their initial be-
liefs are the same, but N2 has an extra edge than N1.
Both evolution processes converge after several steps.
1N1
10
01
1
11
10
1
11
11
1N2
10
01
1
10
00
Figure 2: An example of synchronous belief evolution
1 0
10
0 1
01
1 0
10
……
Figure 3: Synchronous belief evolution for P2
Example 2 illustrates that the network structure is
critical for belief evolution. Although N2 has only one
more edge than N1, the resulting equilibria are quite
different. While the convergence of evolution in N1 is a
consensus, the one in N2 is not. In fact, the former is a
positive consensus, but the majority opinion of the latter
is, on the contrary, negative. Observed from the evolu-
tion process in N2, the majority opinion of the conver-
gence may not be the same as that of the initial profile.
Also, Example 2 shows that there might exist non-
consensus equilibria for some social networks. Actually,
the profile P4 in Example 1 is another one. This shows
that, in some situations, consensus may never be reached
even if the belief evolution process converges.
In Example 2, both evolution processes terminate
within several steps. In fact, it can be shown that, the
synchronous belief evolution for any initial belief profile
of N1 and N2 must converge. Unfortunately, this is not
the case in general.
Example 3 Figure 3 depicts the synchronous belief evo-
lution process for P2 in Example 1 under mN0 , which
falls into a loop P2 → P3 → P2 . . .→ P3 → P2 . . ..
Observed from Example 3, in some situations, syn-
chronous belief evolution under the majority rule func-
tion may never converge. If the network is finite, this
must fall into a loop because synchronous belief evolu-
tion is deterministic. In these cases, there is no final
result of belief evolution.
Now we consider asynchronous belief evolution. Of
course, not all asynchronous evolution sequences con-
verge since synchronous belief evolution is a special case.
Instead, we are concerned with whether a particular se-
quence of groups of agents will lead to a convergence.
Again, consider the belief evolution for P2 in N0 under
the asynchronous context.
Example 4 Figure 4 depicts three different asyn-
chronous evolution sequences for P2 under mN0 . The
1 0
10
1 1
10
1 1
11
1 0
10
1 1
00
1 0
10
0 1
01
0 0
00
Figure 4: Asynchronous belief evolution for P2
agents who evolved their beliefs at the previous round
are shadowed. In this example, all evolution processes
converge.
Compared to the synchronous belief evolution for P2 in
Example 3, there exists an (actually many) asynchronous
evolution sequence that converges. However, different
asynchronous evolution sequences may lead to exactly
opposite results, for instance, the first and the last se-
quences in Example 4.
The following theorem shows that there always exists
a converging sequence for any initial belief profile under
the majority rule function.
Theorem 3 Let N = 〈A, T 〉 be a finite social network.
For any belief profile P of N , there exists a sequence
σ of groups of agents such that the asynchronous belief
evolution for P under mN w.r.t. σ converges.
Proof: We prove a stronger result that this theorem
holds under any monotonic belief evolution function fN .
We directly construct such a sequence, which is divided
into two phrases as follows.
Increasing phrase At each round in this phrase, we
flip over those negative beliefs to positive ones (i.e.
from 0 to 1) whenever possible. Multiple rounds
might be needed. Let P ′ be the final belief profile
obtained in this phrase. Clearly, P ≤ P ′.
Decreasing phrase On the contrary, at each round in
this phrase, we flip over those positive beliefs to
negative ones (i.e. from 1 to 0) whenever possible.
Similarly, multiple rounds might be needed. Let P ′′
be the final belief profile obtained in this phrase.
Clearly, P ′′ ≤ P ′.
We prove that P ′′ must be an equilibrium by contra-
diction. Assume that there exists a ∈ N such that
fa(P
′′) 6= P ′′(a). Then, P ′′(a) = 0 and fa(P ′′) = 1
according to the construction of the decreasing phrase.
Otherwise, a will be further selected in the decreasing
phrase so that P ′′ is not the final profile obtained, a
contradiction. There are two cases:
• P ′(a) = 1. In this case, a must be selected at some
round in the decreasing phrase to flip over from 1
to 0. Therefore, there exists P ∗ in the decreas-
ing phrase such that P ∗(a) = 1 but fa(P ∗) = 0.
Clearly, P ′′ ≤ P ∗ ≤ P ′. Therefore, 1 = fa(P ′′) ≤
fa(P
∗) = 0, a contradiction.
• P ′(a) = 0. In this case, fa(P ′) = 1 since fa(P ′′) = 1
and P ′′ ≤ P ′, which contradicts to our construction
that P ′ is the final profile obtained in the increasing
phrase.
This completes our proof. 
However, the existence of converging asynchronous
evolution does not mean this convergence will eventu-
ally be reached. Firstly, the agents themselves do not
know which sequence will lead to a convergence because
they do not have global information. Secondly, even if
they know a converging sequence, perhaps they are not
cooperative enough to follow it.
Let us go back to the two major reasons for con-
sidering asynchronous belief evolution. First, different
agents may have different frequency of communication
with their friends. Second, agents might be sometimes
over-confident even if they know their friends’ objections.
We can use a random variable to simulate both cases.
This motivates us to consider random asynchronous
belief evolution, in which the agents randomly evolve
their beliefs at each round. More precisely, each agent
is associated with a random Boolean variable to decide
whether or not she will evolve her belief at a certain
time point. The value of the random variable will be
determined according to a probability distribution. For
instance, at the current stage, agent a might have 0.8
chance of evolving her belief while agent b might only
have 0.4. Hence, at a certain time point, a subset of
agents will be generated according to the random vari-
ables, which is the set of agents who will evolve their
beliefs at the current stage. In this sense, random asyn-
chronous belief evolution can be regarded as a statisti-
cal process of asynchronous evolution. We argue that
random asynchronous belief evolution is more realistic
than synchronous belief evolution and asynchronous be-
lief evolution based on intentionally selected sequences.
The following theorem shows that random asyn-
chronous belief evolution will eventually converge.
Theorem 4 For any finite social network and initial be-
lief profile, random asynchronous belief evolution under
the majority rule function always converges.
Proof: To prove this, we need to introduce a notion
called belief profile transition graph. Let N be a social
network and fN the belief evolution functions for agents
in N . The belief profile transition graph for fN is an edge
labeled graph 〈P, T 〉, where P is the set of all belief pro-
files of N , and T is the set of transitions among profiles.
Each edge is labeled with a subset of agents in N . For
two profiles P , P ′ and a subset B of agents, (P, P ′) ∈ T
labeled by B iff P ′ = fBN (P ), i.e., P
′ is the belief profile
obtained from P by applying fN on agents in B.
Now we consider the strongly connected components
of the belief profile transition graph for the majority rule
function. First of all, each equilibrium itself forms a
strongly connected component. Consider the condensa-
tion of the transition graph, which is a directed acyclic
graph. On the one hand, by Theorem 3, a node in the
condensation is a leaf (i.e. no outgoing edge) iff it is an
equilibrium under the majority rule function. On the
other hand, if the network is finite, then for any initial
belief profile, random asynchronous belief evolution will
eventually lead to a leaf in the condensation because any
subset of agents might be generated by randomness for
any profile. This shows that random asynchronous belief
evolution eventually converges. 
To end up this section, we summarize the main obser-
vations and results for belief evolution under the major-
ity rule function.
• The network structure is critical for belief evolution.
• For some networks, there exists non-consensus equi-
librium. As a consequence, consensus may never be
reached in belief evolution.
• For synchronous belief evolution, the evolution pro-
cess may never converge for some initial belief pro-
files.
• The majority opinion of the convergence might not
be the same as the one of the initial profile.
• For asynchronous belief evolution, there always ex-
ists an evolution sequence leading to a convergence
for any initial belief profile. In some cases, there
might exist many, and the resulting final equilibria
could be quite different.
• Random asynchronous belief evolution processes al-
ways converge.
4 Related Work
Belief and opinion dynamics in social network is widely
studied in related fields. Several rule of thumbs mod-
els are proposed in the literature [DeGroot, 1974; Fried-
kin and Johnsen, 2010; Krause, 2000; Hegselmann and
Krause, 2002; DeMarzo et al., 2003; Ellison and Fuden-
berg, 1993; Golub and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu et al.,
2010]. In DeGroot’s [1974] seminal work, each agent has
an initial opinion (a continuous value), and iteratively
evolves her belief by taking a weighted sum of her neigh-
bors’ opinions. Our framework shares some similar ideas
but differs from it on the following aspects. First, we in-
tend to propose a framework rather than a model, in
which the belief evolution function can be defined ar-
bitrarily under some restrictions. Yet we also consider
a representative model of this framework. Second, in
our framework, the value is discrete rather than contin-
uous because we are concerned with beliefs rather than
opinions. Finally, in DeGroot’s model, the agents evolve
their beliefs simultaneously, while we consider both syn-
chronous and asynchronous belief evolutions.
Another highly related work is from the area of statis-
tical mechanics, particulary interacting particle systems
[Clifford and Sudbury, 1973; Holley and Liggett, 1975].
In the voter model, each agent has an initial belief (either
true or false) and randomly evolves her belief according
to their neighbors’ beliefs under a transition function,
which should satisfy some properties as well. However,
the transition function in the voter model calculates a
probability rate, based on which the agent will flip over
her beliefs. In contrast, the belief evolution function in
our framework directly calculates the value of the belief.
The majority rule evolution function is named from
the same well known approach in voting system [Gaert-
ner, 2009]. Generally speaking, belief evolution can be
considered as voting in a social network for two opposite
candidates. However, in belief evolution, the majority
rule voting is performed locally, individually, distribut-
edly and iteratively, while in voting system, it is per-
formed globally, wholly, contralizedly and only once.
There are other related works, actually from several
different disciplines. For instance, an alternative model
of opinion formation is to take just a single (but not
all) friend’s opinion into account based on their contact
frequency [Acemoglu et al., 2010]. Another interesting
approach, called replicator dynamics [Sandholm, 2010],
takes the historical performance of beliefs into account,
and the belief that performs better in the past will be
more likely replicated. However, for space reasons, we
are not able to discuss all of them in details.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the problem of belief evolu-
tion in social networks. To sum up, the main contribu-
tions are as follows.
• We introduced a general framework for belief evo-
lution in social networks. In this framework, the
agents form an initial belief profile on a statement
based on evidences and observations, and then start
to communicate each other in the social network to
update their beliefs according to their belief evo-
lution functions. The belief evolution process is
performed iteratively, either synchronously or asyn-
chronously.
• We argued that a rational belief evolution func-
tion should satisfy some desirable properties such
as boundedness and monotonicity.
• We focused on the majority rule belief evolution
function, which satisfies all properties mentioned
above. The main discoveries for majority rule belief
evolution are summarized in the end of Section 3.
• In particular, we focused on the convergence prob-
lem. For synchronous belief evolution, the process
may never terminate. For asynchronous belief evo-
lution, we show that there always exists a converg-
ing evolution sequence for any initial profile. More
interestingly, random asynchronous belief evolution,
arguably corresponding to belief evolution in the re-
ality, always converges.
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